The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History

ISSN: 0308-6534 (Print) 1743-9329 (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/fich20

# Anglo-Indians and the Punjab Partition: Identity, Politics, and the Creation of Pakistan

Yaqoob Khan Bangash

**To cite this article:** Yaqoob Khan Bangash (2023) Anglo-Indians and the Punjab Partition: Identity, Politics, and the Creation of Pakistan, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 51:1, 124-155, DOI: 10.1080/03086534.2022.2086202

**To link to this article:** https://doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2022.2086202

© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

Published online: 04 Jul 2022.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 4677

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Citing articles: 1 View citing articles

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fich20

THE JOURNAL OF IMPERIAL AND COMMONWEALTH HISTORY
2023, VOL. 51, NO. 1, 124–155
https://doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2022.2086202

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

OPEN ACCESS Check for updates

# Anglo-Indians and the Punjab Partition: Identity, Politics, and the Creation of Pakistan

Yaqoob Khan Bangash

Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, Oxford, UK

**ABSTRACT**

Anglo-Indians are often overlooked in the discourse on the independence of India and Pakistan. However, despite their small numbers, Anglo-Indians punched above their weight and had a significant presence in various critical fields, as well as active and robust and political organisations. This paper traces the development of Anglo-Indian politics in the Punjab, a province which (like Bengal) was partitioned in 1947. Starting with the general Anglo-Indian quest to locate both their identity and nationality in the 1940s, this paper investigates why and how the community leaders in the Punjab not only broke with the central leadership but also argued for a very novel, 'Anglo-Muslim' identity, as they began supporting the Muslim League. This change of stance was much to the chagrin of the central leadership which, by 1947, was firmly tied to the Indian National Congress. This paper thus not only substantially improves our understanding of the politics of the Anglo-Indians during partition, especially at a provincial level, but enables us to understand the manoeuvrings for survival of small communities at a time when the focus seemed to be on only the Muslims and Hindus (and Sikhs in the context of the Punjab).

**KEYWORDS**

India; Pakistan; Punjab; partition; Anglo-Indians; C.E. Gibbon; Frank Anthony; All-India Anglo-Indian Association

## Introduction

'We couldn't go home. We couldn't become English because we were half Indian. We couldn't become Indian because we were half English. We could only stay where we were and be what we were,' remarked Patrick Taylor, an Anglo-Indian railway man in the acclaimed film *Bhowani Junction*, summing up both the identity question and the dilemma faced by the community at the time of the creation of India and Pakistan and the partition of the provinces of Bengal and Punjab in 1947.[1] Straddling the 'middle-tier' between the white rulers and the brown ruled, the Anglo-Indians upset the neat binary between

**CONTACT** Yaqoob Khan Bangash yaqoob.bangash@gmail.com LM South Asia Institute, Harvard University, 4th Floor, 1730 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MA, 02138, USA

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.

the coloniser and the colonised in South Asia. They challenged both the British and the Indians: they mixed the 'superior' white blood of the British with the natives, were 'half-caste' for the Indians, and in most cases were a result of marriages or affairs between the lower social strata of both British and Indian society, much to the chagrin of the upper classes.[2] Despised by both sides, Anglo-Indians were yet bound by ties of blood, culture and locality to both Britain and India.[3] Variations of class, colour and origin often made Anglo-Indians hard to classify (in fact till 1911 they were officially called Eurasians in the census) and their wide dispersal throughout India further complicated their social and political recognition.

Despite their small numbers and fluid boundaries, the Anglo-Indians made their mark on the Indian state and society. Bolstered by reservations, the railways and telegraph departments were often seen as Anglo-Indian enclaves during the Raj, with a significant number of Anglo-Indians also present in the nursing and education sectors. An Anglo-Indian regiment, the Anglo-Indian Force, recruited during the First World War, further increased their visibility. Politically too the Anglo-Indians had a presence with J.R. Wallace being active in the 1890s for Anglo-Indian rights, while W.C. Madge was the first Anglo-Indian to be nominated to the Imperial Legislative Council in 1910. From 1921 onwards Anglo-Indians received their provincial seats by nomination, with the exception of the Bengal and Madras legislatures where they were by election, and then under the Communal Award of 1932 their total number of representatives chosen via separate electorates increased dramatically, which took effect with the implementation of the 1935 Government of India Act in 1937.[4] Thus their seats in the provinces ranged from three seats in Bengal, to two seats in Madras and Bombay, one each in Punjab, United Provinces, Bihar and Central Provinces, and no seats in Assam, NWFP, Orissa and Sind.[5] In the central legislature, Anglo-Indians were granted a total of four seats out of a total of 250 seats in British India.[6]

Anglo-Indian politics was distinguished by two main features. Foremost was their staunch support of the British government. As most Anglo-Indians identified with the British, and some even attempted to pass as fully British or European, their allegiance to the British government in India was paramount. They were a product of British rule in India as a community, and so could scarcely think of turning against the reason for their existence. Secondly, despite religious commonality, Anglo-Indians largely stayed away, or at least distinguished themselves from, Indian Christian politics. While Indian Christians were themselves a minority, their numbers were manifold larger than the Anglo-Indians, but yet the Anglo-Indians preferred to be aligned with the European population in India than the Indian Christians.

As it became clear that the British were going to leave India after the Second World War, Anglo-Indians were left in a quandary. Their staunch support for the British and their racial and cultural identification with them could easily turn them into pariahs in an independent India. Furthermore, their aloofness

from other communities prevented the creation of alliances which could bolster their support, and their small numbers ensured that in a democratic India they would be simply swept away as a political force. Therefore, the 1940s was a critical time for the Anglo-Indians to refashion their identity and politics so that they could survive in a de-colonised British India.[7]

This paper focuses on the development of Anglo-Indian politics in the Punjab. Being the headquarter of the North-Western Railway, Lahore had a significant population of Anglo-Indians, while there were also a considerable number of Anglo-Indians in the posts and telegraph department, hospitals and schools. They were always represented in the legislature of the Punjab and by 1947 it was estimated that there were anywhere between six and eight thousand Anglo-Indians in the Punjab. More so than in other provinces, the Anglo-Indians in the Punjab (and also Bengal), had an additional issue to manage in 1947: the provinces of Punjab and Bengal were to be divided along Muslim and non-Muslim lines. This meant that almost every community, including the Anglo-Indians, would be torn apart. While it was clear that the two sides were Muslims on the one hand and Hindus and Sikhs on the other, it was unclear what stance or direction the other communities should take in the division. In addition to the Anglo-Indians there were nearly half a million Indian Christians, over ten thousand Domiciled Europeans, over forty-five thousand Jains and a smattering of Buddhists and Jews in the Punjab province.[8] However, since only Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians had active political organisations and representation in the legislature (it was expected that most of the Domiciled Europeans would leave), their voices became the most pronounced during the partition deliberations.

After a time of being ignored in scholarship, Anglo-Indians began to feature in sociological debates on 'marginalisation,' and later 'creolisation' by the late 1970s.[9] This effort was mainly led by anthropologists where the 'hybridity' of the Anglo-Indians finally became an interesting differential to explore amidst the popular binary of the ruler and the ruled in the colonial and postcolonial context. These bi-polar labels and approaches were challenged by scholars like Laura Stoler who forced us to rethink 'Colonial Categories,'[10] and then Cooper (with Stoler) who ' … questioned the very dualism that divided colonizer from colonized,' and ' … sought to identify the processes by which they were mutually shaped in intimate engagement, attraction and opposition.'[11] Several anthropological studies on Anglo-Indians followed, with the works of Laura Bear on Anglo-Indians as a railway caste, and of Lionel Caplan on Anglo-Indians in Madras, as important interventions.[12]

Historical work on Anglo-Indians and their politics has, however, been a critical omission in the developing literature on Anglo-Indians. Only the recent work of Uther Charlton-Stevens closely interrogates how Anglo-Indian identity and community formation exhibited itself in the political realm. In it, Charlton-Stevens does mention the Punjab branch of the Anglo-

Indian Association, but is silent on its politics during or after partition. In a later article, however, Charlton-Stevens engages with the Punjab branch but more within the context of the leaders of the Anglo-Indians in the Punjab trying to 'rebrand' their identity in the wake of partition, similar to what the Anglo-Burman leader Campagnac attempted a decade earlier after the separation of Burma from India, than a wider discussion of Anglo-Indian politics in the province.[13] Similarly, Dorothy McMenamin's PhD thesis, while devoting a whole chapter to experiences of Anglo-Indians during partition, does not talk about the politics at all. In fact, she mentions that except for one of her oral history subjects, 'none of the other interviewees from the North West knew of Gibbons, Few, Shave or any Anglo-Indian leaders in Pakistan, nor even Frank Anthony in India.'[14] Furthermore, except for a lone article by McMenamin which mentions the Punjab in the broader context on partition and independence violence, and later forms part of her PhD, mention of the Punjab is also eerily absent from the twenty volumes spanning twenty-five years of the *International Journal of Anglo-Indian Studies*.[15]

Anglo-Indians and their politics have also routinely been understood from an all-India, central perspective. Writing in 2000 about the Anglo-Indians in Madras, Caplan asserted that '… I have no reason to believe that the historical, social or cultural developments to be considered in this book are in any significant way different from settlements in other major urban centres of India.'[16] However, as this article shows, not all Anglo-Indians had the same notion of identity, that there were certainly regional variations in terms of politics, and that there were varied imaginations of their future. Thus, this article complicates our one-dimensional understanding of Anglo-Indians in the run up to partition and independence.

In historiography on the partition of the Punjab, Anglo-Indians are almost invisible. As noted by Yasmin Khan, Lord Mountbatten's 3 June 1947 'sweeping plan' which sought to cater to the interests of the 'larger' Muslim, Sikhs (and to an extent) Sikh communities, simply 'pushed aside' the smaller communities of '"untouchables," Christians and Anglo-Indians.'[17] Thus, Anglo-Indians do not feature in the first-hand memoires of the high politics of 1947, nor in the subsequent secondary works based on official sources.[18] Even in the broader works on the partition recently which aim to recover a more human, or subaltern, aspect, the Anglo-Indians do not feature.[19] The only time Anglo-Indians are mentioned is usually within either the context of voting with the Muslim League in the Punjab Assembly on 23 June 1947 or at most a one-line comment that they supported the Muslim League case before the boundary commission.[20] They were certainly a small community, but since they had representation in the Punjab Assembly and were present in critical occupations, their voice certainly merits consideration. The Anglo-Indians were not mere passive observers of the partition of the Punjab in the summer of 1947, and as such their experiences are valuable for a fuller understanding of the partition

and its dynamics. The choices that Anglo-Indians made, and the reasoning behind them, are all critical as we understand how different communities understood and responded to partition. Being one of the 'unrelated' communities, since they were not part of the political discussions which brought about the partition, their choices at that moment become even more interesting as they chose between a Hindu and Sikh East Punjab and a predominately Muslim West Punjab.

In order to fully assess the nature, direction and effect of Anglo-Indian politics in the Punjab during and after partition, this paper is divided into three parts. The first part, briefly, situates Anglo-Indian politics in its larger Indian context before focusing on the development of Anglo-Indian politics in the Punjab. The second section examines the direction of Anglo-Indian politics in the Punjab during the summer of 1947, focusing on how it aimed to make the best out of a very fraught situation. The third section traces the Anglo-Indian representation in front of the Punjab Boundary Commission and their arguments in favour of Pakistan therein. The conclusion then discusses the impact of the choices made by the Anglo-Indians during the partition of the Punjab.

## Anglo-Indian Politics in India and the Punjab

Anglo-Indian politics became national mainly during the First World War when the various associations and groups of Anglo-Indians federated together for war recruitment. However, this wartime cooperation did not last long and two powerful groups emerged: the Anglo-Indian Empire League under John Abbott, and a rival group based in Calcutta. Soon Abbott was supplanted by his own deputy, Henry Gidney, who then led the largest group of Anglo-Indians under the All-India Anglo-Indian Association for two decades (renamed from the Empire League in 1919). It was then under the leadership of Gidney, who was later knighted in 1931 primarily for his services as an Anglo-Indian politician (he had also retired as a Lieutenant-Colonel from the Indian Medical Service), that Anglo-Indians emerged as a political force in India.

Gidney's great achievement during his two decades at the helm of the Association was the official sanction of reservations for Anglo-Indians. These reservations had become important since unlike the past when certain positions were practically reserved for Anglo-Indians, from 1919 onwards there was a larger emphasis on Indianisation and opening up all jobs without reservations. This, as Grimshaw notes, spelled the economic death knell for Anglo-Indians because 'never having developed enterprises of their own and having no foothold in the commercial life of India, Anglo-Indians became increasingly dependent upon government employment.'[21] By the 1930s, these changed conditions had made poverty a 'chronic problem' in the community.[22]

Gidney travelled to London for the Round Table Conferences in the 1930s on the future constitutional framework on India. In London, his focus was on two things: first to get some assurances as to the maintenance of reservations for Anglo-Indians as a minority community in the services, and secondly to play an emotive claim on the British for their moral duty to support the Anglo-Indians. Gidney argued there was a 'special claim the Anglo-Indian community has on the British Parliament and … public. We are the sons of those pioneer Britishers who went to India … We have shed our blood in the building up and maintenance of the British Government in that country.'[23] Thus, in the words of Lord Lloyd, Gidney went from 'conference to conference, from India Office to House of Commons; House of Commons to House of Lords, and all the way back and in between, educating and assisting those sympathetic to his case, and gathering the views of those who supported him.'[24] In the end, his emotive pleas and persistent lobbying worked and the resulting amendment from Lord Lloyd was called an 'economic Magna Carta' for the Anglo-Indians. The Government of India Act 1935 then gave effect to the reservations. For the railways, customs, postal and telegraph services, article 242 noted: 'In framing rules for the regulation of recruitment [there shall be] due regard to the past association of the Anglo-Indian community with … services in India, and particularly to the specific class, character and numerical percentages of the posts hitherto held by members of that community and the remuneration attaching to such posts … '[25] Gidney came back to India a hero for achieving this protection for the interests of the Anglo-Indians.

As the Second World War progressed and the Allies were pushed on the back foot both in the Western and Asian fronts, it became clear that a political settlement in India must be achieved to ensure full support in the war effort. Despite being very cognizant that the British were going to leave India soon, Gidney did not prioritise a settlement with the Indian political parties, but wanted the British to ensure Anglo-Indian privileges on account of their racial and cultural connections and loyalty. Thus, when the Cripps Mission came to India in 1942, Gidney asked for reservations for Anglo-Indians for fifty years, together with ten million pounds, and even a demand of 200,000 acres of land to resettle most Anglo-Indians in one area. Of course, as noted by Gidney's own Vice President, pressing Cripps on these demands was 'doomed to disappointment,' and that is exactly what happened.[26]

Sir Henry Gidney passed away in May 1942, and was succeeded as President of the All-India Anglo-Indian Association by Frank Anthony, his close associate of many years. As soon as he took on the reins, Anthony sensed that a change of stance was essential if the community were to survive. He noted: 'the community could no longer stand on two stools. It could no longer express a political dichotomy.'[27] In his first major speech to the Association, Anthony said: 'We are Anglo-Indians by community … But let us always remember that we are Indians. The Community is Indian. It has always been

Indian.'[28] An article in the *Anglo-Indian Review* put it succinctly: 'It is not a question of repressing the "Anglo" in us but a question of releasing the "Indian" … '[29] This claim of 'Anglo-Indian by community, and Indian by nationality,' was the shift Anthony was spearheading knowing that since the British were unlikely to safeguard the interests of the community, he should project the community squarely as Indian so that they could obtain some concessions from a future government of independent India, which was evidently going to be led by the Congress party.

Frank Anthony's overtures to the Congress also meant opposition to the partition of India, the rallying cry of the Muslim League. With Anglo-Indians thinly spread throughout India, partition could only further divide the community and make its voice weaker. Already in his submission to the Sapru Commission in 1945, Anthony had noted his opposition towards any partition, giving four reasons for his opposition. First, Anthony argued that in the proposed area of Pakistan there would still be a considerable number of non-Muslims, and a large number of Muslims would also remain in India. Hence, he argued, 'the minorities problem after the division of India would be as acute, perhaps much more acute, in both Pakistan and Hindustan as it is today.' Secondly, he pointed out that the Muslim League plan would 'lead to the Balkanising of India,' potentially 'emasculating' India as an 'international power.' Anthony's third argument was that India was unlike Europe and so there was no basis for division as India had achieved 'a basic ethnic and cultural unity.' Lastly, Anthony maintained that the division of India would lead to war between the two countries and the 'propagation of narrow and fanatical economic and political ideologies.'[30]

Frank Anthony's opposition to the Muslim League became more apparent in his reaction to the exclusion of the Anglo-Indians from the Simla Conference in 1945, which he squarely blamed on the Muslim League. He argued that all other parties would have accepted an Anglo-Indian representative except the Muslim League because 'it was the original position of the Muslim League to claim parity of representation as between Muslims on the one hand and all the communities on the other … Their plea to the Viceroy was that if the smaller minorities also received representation, the Muslim League would only get 1/3rd of the total representation.'[31] Thus, by 1945 it was fairly clear that Frank Anthony was aligning himself not only with the Congress, but in opposition to the Muslim League.

As Frank Anthony embarked on changing the stance of the Anglo-Indians in 1942–1943, his first criticism came from the Lahore Branch of the Association. Mr E. Few, who was president of the Lahore Branch and also a member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly, immediately criticised the developing pro-Congress stance of the President-in-Chief.[32] The missive of Few was angrily responded to by Anthony's central governing body which held that Few's remarks were irresponsible and that 'the Punjab Branch in adopting a

resolution of a threatening nature and circulating this to the Branches was thoroughly incorrect, unconstitutional, and not conducive to good discipline within the Association.'[33] The very next month, in March 1943, Few challenged the strong reaction of the governing body and said that his Lahore Branch could not support the new stance of the President-in-Chief and that their position should be 'pro-Government and pro-British,' as in the past.[34] Matters began to get heated and so Anthony diffused the situation by informing Few that 'his policy was certainly not "pro-Congress" or "pro-Muslim League"' and that he had not aligned the Association with any political party.'[35] This incident showed that while Frank Anthony might be the national leader of the Anglo-Indians there was certainly dissension with his views at the provincial level, and especially in the Punjab.

As the discussions over the fate of India continued, elections were held for the central and provincial assemblies in India over the winter of 1945–1946. In the Punjab there had always been an Anglo-Indian representative in the assembly. During the tenure of the four legislative councils (1921–1936), the Anglo-Indians were coupled with the Europeans for two seats in the council. Thus, Mr Owen Roberts represented the joint Anglo-Indian and European seat on all the councils, while Dr D.C. Owens was part of the first and second, and Dr Mrs Shave was part of the third and fourth councils.[36] In the 1937 elections, the Anglo-Indian seat was separated from the Europeans with each community being able to elect one on the basis of the community electorate. Hence, Mr E. Few, the president of the Lahore Branch of the Anglo-Indian Association, got elected on the Anglo-Indian seat while Professor Sir William Roberts won the European seat.

In the Punjab Assembly, Mr Few not only represented the Anglo-Indian Association but also the Unionist party which was also in government in the province.[37] An assessment of his speeches in the Punjab Assembly highlight three elements of his politics. First, Few was committed to the cause of his community and always represented their concerns in the Assembly. For example, when there was a question over recruitment in the police – where there were a good number of Anglo-Indians, Few underscored the contribution of his community in the maintenance of law and order in the province. He said:

> The Anglo Indian is in a minority but I think it will be admitted that he has been second to none in the development of India and the service he has rendered to the country … Anglo Indians are still very useful particularly in dealing with critical situations. I would remind the House through you that some years ago when a notable communal trial was held in Rawalpindi the services of an Anglo-Indian Magistrate from Lahore were requisitioned to try the cases. Again, in the unfortunate recent clash at Panipat we find soon after an Anglo-Indian magistrate drafted to that list.[38]

Similarly, he raised the issue of the long hours of continuous night duty undertaken by nurses – a profession where there were a lot of Anglo-Indians, and

demanded that the government bring the hours down to manageable levels.[39] Here in addition to Few's concern for his community, it is interesting to note that in example of the Anglo-Indian magistrate above, Few also positioned his community in the role of an impartial mediator among other Indian communities. As the situation in the Punjab was always tense between the Hindus, Muslim and Sikhs (and bound to get worse as British departure hastened), Few underscored the critical need of his community to be in important positions so that they could keep the peace between the communities.

Secondly, Few was fiercely pro-British, something which had always been a plank of most Anglo-Indian politicians in India. In 1941, for example, he submitted a resolution which asked the government to 'to adopt effective administrative measures to cope with the vicious activities' of any group of people who may 'create panic or public alarm, or promote communal strife,' even by taking 'further powers by means of passing such fresh legislation as it may consider desirable.'[40] At a time when the Defence of India rules had created a martial law type atmosphere in India, asking the government to take more measures was certainly exceptional. But it was Few's loyalty both to the Empire and the Unionist party which led him to present this resolution. No wonder then that a member of the opposition even asked him if this resolution was only presented at the behest of the party. Malik Barkat Ali asked, 'whether Mr Few himself drafted the resolution and moved it of his own accord or whether it was an accident of party discipline, viz., that, the party whip asked him to sign this resolution, which has placed him in this predicament.'[41] In fact, it seems that the Anglo-Indians had a long association with the Unionist party due to its cross-community appeal as Charlton-Stevens notes that earlier 'Gidney … [had] join[ed] other Indian Empire loyalists, particularly Muslim and Punjabi landowners, to form a cross-communal Unionist party.'[42] Thus, affiliation with the Unionists was long-standing and strong for the Anglo-Indians in the Punjab.

Thirdly, Few was also clearly anti-Congress, more so when it opposed the war effort. Speaking on the War Resolution in 1939, Few blasted the Congress party and accused it of unpatriotic behaviour. Few exclaimed:

> we are at a very critical stage just now when the Empire is in a life and death struggle, and the Congress has sprung on us a demand that they should be allowed some sort of government by which they can perpetuate tyranny of the majority on the minority. You hear these people very glibly talking of freedom, what is freedom? This House is an emblem of that freedom? We do not want that kind of freedom whereby the Congress can perpetuate tyranny as is being done in the Congress governed provinces under the garb of non-violence put forward by Mr. Gandhi.[43]

Few continued his attack on the stance of the Congress and noted that refusal to support the war ' … shows the Congress in its worst and naked form of pure communal selfishness', asserting that 'no humanity is left in the High Command.'[44]

Meanwhile an almost opposite stance was being formulated by Frank Anthony at the centre regarding the Congress. As the discussions over the future of India progressed, Frank Anthony realised that the British were not going to give the Anglo-Indians any promises or concessions and that the only way for him was to reach out to the Congress so that the community could get some safeguards in an independent India. Already the Cabinet Mission, sent to India in 1946 to finalise the future constitutional framework of India, had ignored the Anglo-Indians both in not giving them any reserved seats in the Constituent Assembly and in the formation of the interim government. Dismayed and with a feeling of betrayal a heated session of the Anglo-Indian Association in June 1946 passed a resolution which read: 'This general meeting of the Anglo-Indians views with incredulity and bitterness the deliberate exclusion of this community from the interim government in spite of our recognised right to a seat.'[45] The resolution further called on its members to 'express their emphatic protest by resigning from all voluntary services, refraining to render any assistance and not to contribute to any charitable or other funds organised by the present administration … '[46] While these measures were not very significant, for a very loyal community, these constituted a form of 'direct action against the administration,'[47] and exhibited their anxiety and frustration over their exclusion from discussions on the future of India.

Anthony underscored that both times it was the Congress who came to the rescue of the community and granted them two additional seats (in addition to his own which he won with the help of the Anglo-Indian legislators in Bengal), and by the Congress making 'a request to the Viceroy that an Anglo-Indian should be included in the Interim Government in preference to a Parsi, as we are more numerous than the Parsis, and the latter had had representation in Government on previous occasions.'[48] He noted that it was the Viceroy himself who turned down the Congress proposal for the interim government which included his name as the Anglo-Indian member and squarely charged the British with forcing the 'political and subsequent economic extinction' of the Anglo-Indians.[49] The deep sense of hurt and betrayal at the hands of the British was patent in all the statements of Anthony as he could not fathom that despite the Congress agreeing to give them seats, and even a ministry in the interim government, that the British, with whom they had racial, cultural and religious ties, would oppose the proposals. Anthony thus charged: 'History will find it almost impossible to produce a parallel instance where representatives of a particular nation have gone out of their way to destroy a community, fighting for its rights against tremendous odds, for whose existence that nation is responsible … We at least did not expect this unwarranted betrayal.'[50] The breach was now complete between the Anglo-Indians and the British, and from now onwards Frank Anthony closely allied himself with the Congress.

The concessions Frank Anthony received from the Congress – the nomination for the interim government and seats in the Constituent Assembly – were indeed impressive. While the seat in the interim government was never realised due to the opposition of the Viceroy, the Congress helped elect two Anglo-Indians to the Constituent Assembly, in addition to the one Anthony won himself from Bengal with the support of the Anglo-Indian legislators. These two additional seats were a result of Anthony's parlays with Gandhi, Nehru and Sardar Patel, where the latter very easily promised him Congress support. Anthony recounted that Patel:

> … said that since we had 12 seats in the Provincial Legislatures, he would be prepared, on my assurance of their voting solidly at my direction, to recommend 3 seats for the Community in the Constituent Assembly. He said that the Anglo-Indians would have to vote in support of the non-Anglo-Indian Congress candidate in States where no Anglo-Indian candidate could be returned, but that from three Provincial Assemblies he would ensure, by giving us the necessary number of Congress votes, that 3 Anglo-Indians were returned to the Constituent Assembly.[51]

This was certainly a great victory for Anthony as it secured the voice of the Anglo-Indian community in the Constituent Assembly of India. But why did the Congress grant the community such concessions especially when it was wary of granting the same to other communities? While Anthony himself does not dwell on the reasons in his autobiography and Charlton-Stevens is right in noting that this success was a result of 'a mix of beneficence and cold calculation from the Congress leadership and closely associated major constitutional framers,' it can also be argued that since the Anglo-Indians were both a racial and religious minority, whose small numbers were never expected to dramatically increase it was easier for the Congress to shower its largesse on a tiny minority. Furthermore, since the Anglo-Indians were also largely pro-government, the Congress could have also estimated that they could always depend on their votes. In any case, the grant of the three seats bolstered the Anglo-Indian support for the Congress, and Frank Anthony was subsequently elected from Bengal, with C.E. Gibbon elected on a Congress ticket from the Central Provinces, and Stanley Henry Prater elected from Madras. Anthony's stature was soon augmented by his election as the Deputy President of the Constituent Assembly.[52] Anthony also became a member of the Committee on Framing Rules, the Credentials Committee, the Advisory Committee on Minorities and the Minorities Sub-Committee.[53] Gibbon too became member of the Finance and Staff Committee.[54] Thus, it seemed that on the eve of the departure of the British from India, and the creation of the dominions of India and Pakistan, the Anglo-Indians were firmly in the Congress camp and were in fact elected on its tickets in the Constituent Assembly. However, what was patent at the all-Indian level, was not as clear in all the provinces.

## Anglo-Indian Politics in the Punjab in 1947

In the 1946 elections, Mr P. Manuel was elected to the lone Anglo-Indian seat in the Punjab. Manuel, an independent, defeated Mr E. Few, the president of the Anglo-Indian Association in the Punjab and a candidate for the Unionist party, with 178 votes to 111 votes. Interestingly, only 304 people voted in this constituency, which included fifteen invalid votes, out of a total electorate of 813, meaning that only about 37.4% of the eligible Anglo-Indians even voted. Since it was a crucial election for the future of India, such a low turnout was indeed exceptional, since except for the European constituency where a mere 15% voted, Indian Christian constituencies polled well above 50% in each of its two seats.[55] Perhaps, like the Europeans, the Anglo-Indians were planning on emigrating after partition, or maybe the uncertainty of the situation where they seem to have become passive observers pushed them into inaction. Mr Manuel did not last long and resigned in a few months. In the ensuing by-election, the papers of a Mr S.R. Lewis were rejected and so the new president of the Anglo-Indian Association of the Punjab, Mr C.E. Gibbon got elected unopposed. Significantly, while the Anglo-Indian representatives in the Punjab had always aligned themselves with Unionist party, or remained independent, and even though Mr Gibbon was elected as an independent, he soon declared his support for the Muslim League.[56] This was certainly a watershed as no Anglo-Indian legislator had declared themselves for the Muslim League anywhere, and by that time the Anglo-Indian Association was firmly wedged with the Congress party, at least in the centre. Even more fascinating was the fact that within days of being elected to the Punjab Assembly, Mr Gibbon also became a candidate for the Congress from the Central Provinces for a seat in the Constituent Assembly at Delhi.[57] It seems that Gibbon, cognizant of the emerging reality – of the Muslim League being the power broker in the Punjab and the Congress in the centre – had begun to hedge his bets. In a significant show of pragmatism (or opportunism?), Gibbon chose to represent diametrically opposing parties at the province and centre, and, apparently, without any sense of contradiction! Perhaps in the 'shameful flight', as Churchill once put it, everything was up for grabs and so the representatives of this tiny community were out to get whatever benefit they could from any party who would give them some support.

While Frank Anthony was open to good relations with the Muslim League, and even went to see Jinnah with Gibbon on 11 April 1947 to discuss 'with him the position of Anglo-Indians in the Muslim majority areas,' he was not prepared to enter into any alliance with the Muslim League to the detriment of his flourishing relationship with the Congress.[58] Thus, as Gibbon got close to the Muslim League in the Punjab, a gulf soon began to emerge between the provincial and the national president. Anthony notes in his autobiography that in both the Punjab and Bengal he began to impress upon the Anglo-Indian

legislators the fact that the Congress was in power in provinces where the vast majority of the Anglo-Indians lived, that since over 80% of the Anglo-Indians depended on the central government for jobs, and the Congress with its majority in the Constituent Assembly was poised to come into power in the centre, they should not be led by 'any temporary or local issues or to do anything which would antagonise the largest party, the Congress.'[59]

As the Muslim League party in the Punjab began to jockey to form the government after the fall of the Unionist-led Sir Khizr Hayat Khan ministry in March 1947, Anthony immediately issued a statement decrying Gibbon's vocal support for the Muslim League. Trying not to name Gibbon, but clearly referring to him, Anthony stated that 'I feel that these statements have been issued without a full appreciation of the all the implications for the Anglo-Indian community … Such statements are not only unnecessary but dangerous … .In such a delicate condition a small minority like the Anglo-Indians must remain strictly neutral and stand assiduously aside.'[60] Where it might have served the Anglo-Indians well in the past to remain largely neutral in government formation, with Frank Anthony himself getting closer to the Congress, Gibbon thought it opportune to create an alliance with the largest party in the Punjab, the Muslim League. With every vote being important to form the next government in the Punjab Assembly, Gibbon was keen that his one vote carried weight, and so he was quick to blast the statement by Anthony declaring that it was causing 'apprehension' about Anglo-Indian policy in the Punjab.'[61] Gibbon stated that while he still preferred an all party ministry, in the absence of an agreement between the parties there was no 'reason why the majority party should be deprived of its constitutional right to form a Ministry.'[62]

Gibbon's clear support of the Muslim League in the Punjab brought about an immediate reaction from both the Anglo-Indian Association as well as other politicians in the Punjab. In a press statement the independent Hindu member of the Punjab Assembly, Rai Bahadur Ganga Saran, blasted the new stance of Gibbon and stated that it were 'political maneuverings which are at the back of this change and not some prophetic intelligence which has given them this new conviction to resolve the ministerial crisis in the Punjab.'[63] The pro-Congress *The Tribune* newspaper echoed the sentiments of Ganga Saran and in an editorial a few days later warned Gibbon that he must not create an impression that he is a partisan. It noted 'Such a thing might antagonise a major party against them … [and] such antagonism must be avoided in the interests of the Anglo-Indian community itself.'[64] With each vote precious for the formation of a ministry in the Punjab, all sides were keeping a close eye on even the smallest of shifts.

Meanwhile, the governing body of the All India Anglo-Indian Association met on 27 April and issue a stern demarche to Gibbon. The governing body condemned Gibbon's statement on the formation of the Punjab ministry in

support of the Muslim League and directed him to 'refrain in future from making any statement without the previous permission of the Governing Body.'[65] Later Frank Anthony went to Lahore and spoke to a gathering of the association himself to allay any fears. Asking them to wait a few months till matters were clearer he told them not to get 'panicky' and expressed hope that 'there is no reason to believe that any party is going to victimise us or to discriminate against us.'[66] However, with time running out Gibbon decided to take matters into his own hands and began to steer a separate path for the Anglo-Indians in the Punjab. In order to set the stage for a final break, Gibbon first called a meeting of the committee of the Punjab Branch on 10 May where the committee reposed their 'complete confidence' in the leadership of Gibbon. The committee further called on the governing body of the national association to withdraw its earlier stricture against Gibbon and 'leave it to the Punjab Anglo-Indians and their elected representative to follow a policy suited to the Province.'[67]

With the rift between the all-India president and the Punjab president now out in the public domain, Gibbon began to steer a separate path for the Anglo-Indians in the Punjab. On 6 June 1947 Gibbon announced the creation of an 'Anglo-Indian Association of Pakistan,' just three days after the formal announcement of the creation of Pakistan under the 3 June plan by Lord Mountbatten, the Viceroy and Governor General of India. Gibbon charged that he was forced to take this drastic decision to separate the Punjab branch from the All-India Anglo-Indian Association because:

> the bitterly resented, political directive and interference in provincial affairs by the Governing Body of the All India Anglo-Indian Association at Delhi, has given rise to the demand by an overwhelming majority of Anglo-Indians domiciled in the Punjab, Sind, N-WF Province and Baluchistan for the immediate dis-establishment of the All India Anglo-Indian Association in these provinces and for the formation of a new organisation which would be free to pursue policies in keeping with the wishes of the community in a free and democratic state.[68]

Thus, as a result, provincial councils at Karachi, Quetta and Peshawar were formed, and a headquarter was established at Lahore for the new Anglo-Indian Association of Pakistan. *Dawn*, the newspaper of the Muslim League, was quick to acknowledge this move by Gibbon in its editorial noting that it showed that the Anglo-Indians have 'not only exhibited a complete sense of the new developments but have also given a welcome indication of their good-will towards the new State … ' *Dawn* also noted that the Anglo-Indians, or Anglo-Pakistanis as they would now be styled, were 'the first one to display singular initiative in effecting a wholesome reorientation of their political ideology … ' The newspaper also lauded C.E. Gibbon, stating that he had 'rendered yeoman's service to his community,' especially in 'working to expose the opportunistic and suicidal policy of the leadership of the All-India Anglo-Indian

Association which has more or less amounted to a complete and abject surrender of the good sense and discretion of that community at the altar of the Hindu Congress.' *Dawn* commended Gibbon for 'realizing the dangers inherent in an opportunistic and exclusive alliance with caste Hindu leadership and in actively campaigning to arrest the drift.'[69]

After the announcement of the creation of an Anglo-Indian Association of Pakistan, C.E. Gibbon immediately began to work for securing as many concessions as possible from the future Pakistan government. Being the first non-Muslim community leader to have announced for Pakistan, Gibbon hoped that his staunch and early support for Pakistan would obtain sure dividends. Already on 2 May, Gibbon had written to Jinnah trying to secure his agreement to an Anglo-Indian seat in the new Pakistan Constituent Assembly. Gibbon wrote: '… I have no doubt that you will give your anxious consideration, and devise ways and means whereby my Community will not be forgotten and incorporated in a constituency in which either the Congress party or the Hindu Mahasabha will have the upper hand.'[70] Suggesting an option for giving representation to the small Anglo-Indian community Gibbon noted: '… a possible solution would be for you to give Anglo-Indians direct representation, or an allotment of seats from the *majority quota*.'[71] Gibbon also exclaimed that the All-India Anglo-Indian Association should now 'confine its activities to Hindustan,' since 'Anglo-Indians, in the future Pakistan State, must necessarily identify themselves with the national life of their country and the less Mr Anthony meddle with them the better.'[72] He further distanced himself from the long-held position of the Anglo-Indian Association not to align themselves with Indian Christians by noting that 'Pakistan Christians – Indians, Anglo-Indian and European have been functioning as one team … I can assure Mr Anthony that Pakistani Christians have common sense enough to resist his advice that Anglo-Indians should join hands with Indian Christians, only as far as religion is concerned. We have much more in common, and intend to take full advantage of it … '[73]

Gibbon thus began to parlay with Dewan Bahadur S.P. Singha, the speaker of the Punjab Assembly and an Indian Christian legislator who had also begun to support the Muslim League, to negotiate with the upcoming Pakistan government. Both of them first met senior Muslim League leader Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan,[74] and then also met president of the Muslim League and the future Governor General of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, in Delhi on 10 June 1947 for an hour to discuss the future of Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians in Pakistan.[75] After the meeting both Singha and Gibbon expressed their full trust in Jinnah and Pakistan, and Gibbon stated that 'I have no fear regarding the future of my community in Pakistan, provided of course, we play the game and render unto the State what is the State's.'[76] In assuring the Anglo-Indians that Pakistan was the best place for them, Gibbon even contended that if there were Anglo-Indians who were willing to quit independent India, they should consider

coming to Pakistan where he assured them they would be 'happy and contented.' On the issue of his now contradictory representation of the Congress in the Constituent Assembly and his support of the Muslim League in the Punjab, Gibbon announced that he will soon resign from his Congress seat: 'As a potential citizen of Pakistan State, it is not proper for me to continue to be a member of the Hindustan Constituent Assembly to which I was elected by a general constituency of the Central Provinces.'[77] Both Singha and Gibbon were however dismayed that the chances of an Anglo-Indian and Indian Christian becoming a member of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly from the Punjab were slim as out of the eighteen general seats in the Punjab they only had three. Gibbon noted that this was neither the fault of the League or the Congress but the fault of the British and a result of their 'short-sightedness.' Gibbon however reposed even greater trust in Jinnah and stated that 'I have been assured by Mr Jinnah that the Anglo-Indian community will certainly be represented on all or any of the committees set up by the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, where it is necessary for our community to express its views freely.'[78]

The rift between the national and provincial presidents of the Anglo-Indian Association then became permanent when a meeting of Anglo-Indians in Lahore under Frank Anthony's leadership issued a statement against Gibbon where: 'The meeting vehemently condemned the opportunistic policies of Mr. Gibbon, the Provincial President. Several speakers emphasised that the community in the Punjab had been induced to accept him because he was the Association candidate. The members present stated that if, in spite of their proving to the Muslim League that Mr. Gibbon had forfeited their confidence, he was still foisted on them they would, if necessary, concert measures for the mass migration of Anglo-Indians from the Punjab.'[79] After this strong statement, the Association's governing body met in New Delhi on 13 June 1947 and expelled Gibbon from the organisation, and called him to resign from both his Punjab Legislative Assembly seat and the Indian Constituent Assembly seat.[80]

Gibbon replied to Frank Anthony's statements by arguing that in doing so Anthony had 'again betrayed his complete ignorance of the true feelings of the Anglo-Indian community domiciled in the Western Punjab, NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan…' Gibbon emphasised that his meetings with Muslim League leaders left him with 'no doubt' that the Anglo-Indians 'will be given every opportunity to develop … and that their religious, political and cultural rights, as also their interests in the service of the State, will be adequately protected.'[81] Reacting to his expulsion by the Association, Gibbon stated that he had already resigned from the Association on 1 June and from the Indian Constituent Assembly on 11 June. He blamed Anthony for sacrificing the Anglo-Indians in the Punjab 'at the altar of his political expediency' and pledged to show his community the 'right direction,' which, now was unreserved

support for the Muslim League.[82] Gibbon now clearly came out in support of the Muslim League and shortly thereafter hosted a reception in honour of the Muslim League High Command jointly with S.P. Singha. At the reception, both the president of the Punjab Muslim League, the Khan of Mamdot, and central leader Sir Firoz Khan Noon, assured Gibbon that Anglo-Indians will be treated 'on equal footing with the Muslims.'[83] Noon further placated the Anglo-Indian concerns about job safety by declaring that 'the job of member of your community will be as secure in Pakistan as that of a Muslim.'[84] Gibbon was delighted to hear of these assurances and assured the Muslim League of his 'wholehearted support and cooperation.'[85]

Gibbon's first chance to show loyalty towards the Muslim League came on 23 June 1947 when the Punjab Assembly met on the question of which constituent assembly to join and to decide on partition. First the assembly met as a whole under the speaker S.P. Singha to vote on the question of joining either the Pakistan or Indian constituent assembly. In the division, 77 members voted for the existing, i.e. Indian Constituent Assembly, while 91 members voted for the Pakistan Constituent Assembly.[86] Both the Indian Christian members, and Gibbon, voted with the Muslim League and the Muslim members of the Unionist party for Pakistan (the European member of the assembly was barred from participating in this session). With the question of the majority wanting to join Pakistan settled, now the assembly divided in two to vote on whether to partition the province, according to the notional division outlined in the 3 June plan which divided the Punjab along Muslim and non-Muslim majority districts according to the 1941 census. The Muslim majority western section then met under the speaker S.P. Singha, while the non-Muslim majority Eastern section met under the Deputy Speaker, Sardar Kapur Singh. In the ensuing vote, in the western section, out of the 96 present (of a total of 102), 27 voted for partition while 69 voted against it.[87] Again, Gibbon along with the two Indian Christians voted against the partition in line with the Muslim League and Muslim members of the Unionist party. In the eastern section, out of a total of 72 members, 50 voted for partition and 22 against it.[88] Thereafter, the sections voted again for joining either constituent assembly, and here the votes were identical to the earlier division: the western section voted 69 to 27 for joining the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, while the eastern section voted 50 to 22 to stay in the existing constituent assembly.[89] This was perhaps the only truly communal vote in the Punjab Assembly, where, regardless of party lines, all Hindus and Sikhs voted as a block and all Muslims – whether they were Unionists or Muslim Leaguers, and the Indian Christians and Anglo-Indians, also voted in union. Since the eastern section had voted for partition and the existing constituent assembly, partitioning of the hundred-year-old British Punjab had to be effected with West Punjab joining Pakistan and East Punjab, India.

While his lone vote in the Punjab Assembly was not consequential in the end (the difference between the two sides was a lot), Gibbon still strove to achieve some concessions from the incoming government in Pakistan, hoping that his early declaration for the country would earn him dividends. Thus, Gibbon wrote to Jinnah hoping that he would 'remember us when your Constituent Assembly begins its work.'[90] Eager to show his loyalty to the new country, Gibbon also now formally joined a Muslim League meeting on 13 July, and 'promised to secure signatures of Indian Christians for joining Pakistan.'[91] Later, a meeting of the Anglo-Indians from Sind, Baluchistan and West Punjab held in Karachi on 11 August, demanded that the 'Anglo-Indian community in Pakistan should have representation on the Minorities Advisory Committee of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly.'[92] They even created a sub-committee to 'prepare a memorandum setting forth the rights and interests of Anglo-Indian community for submission to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly.'[93]

Even though Gibbon was now fully in the Muslim League camp, it was not clear that all Anglo-Indians in the Punjab supported his stance and accepted him as their leader. As Gibbon's tensions with the central leadership of the Association heightened, a new organisation, the Anglo-Indian and Domiciled European League of North-West India, was established which immediately denounced Gibbon. The organisation's committee meeting on 17 June disassociated itself from the new Anglo-Indian Association of Pakistan created by Gibbon and charged that he 'has proved beyond doubt his utter unworthiness and inability to speak or act on behalf of the community.'[94] It also asked the Muslim League not to have any dealing with Gibbon as the leader of the Anglo-Indians in the Punjab. This new organisation's president was Mr. S.R. Lewis, who had earlier hoped to challenge Gibbon at the ballot box but his papers had been rejected. Now Lewis successfully challenged that rejection and on 25 July 1947 the Election Petition Commission deseated Gibbon from the Punjab Assembly. Lewis' papers had been rejected because his father's name was not mentioned on the nomination paper. The tribunal decided that such an omission was not 'material' and did not 'invalidate the nomination papers of the petitioner.'[95] Thus, on the eve of the creation of Pakistan, Gibbon was not even a member of the Punjab Assembly!

The unseating of Gibbon deeply unsettled his newly founded Anglo-Indian Association of Pakistan and at its meeting on 27 July, it denounced the rival camp. Its governing body charged that the unseating was 'due mainly to the destructive tactics of a group of Anglo-Indians, who intend on migrating at the earliest opportunity … '[96] It noted that under section 93, Governor's Rule, no by-election was even possible and so the Anglo-Indian community had now been deprived of the only representation they had in the Punjab. The meeting pointed out that the rival group had known that the election petition at this time would create such an untenable situation, and so 'the intention

to deprive the community of what representation it had in the Legislature, during the most critical period of its history, was inspired by persons and parties whose motives now stand shamelessly exposed.'[97] The meeting reposed their confidence in the leadership of Mr C.E. Gibbon, and held the rival group 'responsible for any harm which may befall the community, collectively or individually, as a result of their ill-advised activities.'[98] However, the rival Anglo-Indian group was undeterred by this strong reaction and on 12 August 1947, Mr S.R. Lewis now changed the name of his organisation to the 'Anglo-Indian League of All-Pakistan,' to counter the one led by Gibbon.[99]

## Anglo-Indians before the Punjab Boundary Commission

To partition the Punjab between Muslim and non-Muslim majority areas, a Boundary Commission was set up under the chairmanship of the British jurist, Sir Cyril Radcliffe. In addition to the chairman, both the Muslim League and Congress also nominated two members of the commission. The Muslim League chose Mr Justice Din Mohammad and Mr Justice Mohammad Munir from the Lahore High Court, while the Congress nominated Mr Justice Teja Singh and Mr Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan, also from the Lahore High Court. The Bengal Boundary Commission was also under the chairmanship of Sir Cyril Radcliffe with the Muslim League and the Congress nominating two additional members from the Calcutta High Court. The Boundary Commission was mandated to 'demarcate the boundaries of the Punjab on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims.'[100] It was also tasked to 'take into account other factors.'[101] It was the leeway of 'other factors' which led many to believe that they could sway the decision of the commission from deciding strictly on communal numbers. As a result, when the commission invited interested parties to submit memorandums, and also selected a few to appear for oral arguments, many sought to influence the decision by utilising the 'other factors' argument.

Among the organisations which submitted a memorandum to the Punjab Boundary Commission, the faction of the Anglo-Indian Association in the Punjab under C.E. Gibbon submitted its viewpoint, and Gibbon also appeared before the commission on 25 July. By July 1947, Gibbon had cut all ties with the All-India Anglo-Indian Association, and was largely collaborating with S.P. Singha, the Indian Christian speaker of the Punjab Assembly who had also, like Gibbon, aligned with the Muslim League. Through the crucial months of July and August 1947, both Gibbon and Singha worked in tandem and even appeared together at the Boundary Commission where Gibbon followed Singha with his arguments.

Gibbon began his arguments by unequivocally stating his support for the Muslim League and Pakistan. He said: '… I feel that the interests of my small community are well placed in the hands of the architects of Pakistan

… The Anglo-Indians are happy to be in Pakistan. They regard Lahore and the West Punjab as their homeland.'[102] Then, fascinatingly, Gibbon flipped the Christian and Western heritage and identity of the Anglo-Indians by claiming that they were in fact 'Anglo-Muslim' as almost all of them had Muslim roots. About himself he stated: 'My great grandfather married a Muslim princess, and so by descent I am a European-cum-Muslim. Such is the case with practically 99% of the Anglo-Indians of the Punjab. They are descendants of the Muslim race.'[103] This was certainly a unique claim by Gibbon as no Anglo-Indian leader had ever made such a fantastic claim. It seems that in order for the Anglo-Indians to be counted with the Muslims, Gibbon inverted the religious claim of the Muslim community to that of a race, an ethnicity even, and thus made an odd 'racial' claim to Muslim affinity simply because there were no non-Christian Anglo-Indians in the Punjab.

Gibbon also contested the low numbers of the Anglo-Indians in the 1941 census which put them at a meagre 5,891 in British Punjab. Gibbon argued that these were inaccurate numbers as there were at least 4,000 Anglo-Indians in the North Western Railway, headquartered at Lahore, about 1,000 in the posts and telegraph department, over 600 in the Punjab Government and 2,000 in other jobs. Thus, there were 'approximately 8,000 Anglo-Indians' in the Punjab, Mr Gibbon retorted.[104] He also underscored the special bond of the Anglo-Indians with the city of Lahore and emphasised their key role in its development: 'We claim the most up to date schools and colleges: we claim to have placed the medical profession and the nursing services in the position in which they are today … we built and developed the railways; we have built and controlled the Posts and Telegraphs; we hold positions of responsibility and trust in provincial and Central Government Services, and are in key positions in the departments responsible for maintaining law and order.'[105] Keeping in view the significant contribution by only a small community in the Punjab, Gibbon said that the Anglo-Indians 'lay a very special claim to the city of Lahore … for the very fact that this city was planned and developed with our sweat, toil, culture and initiative.'[106] Thus, he argued that their small community should not be split but 'consolidated' in the Punjab in favour of Pakistan.[107]

Mr Gibbon further explained why the interests of the Anglo-Indians did not mesh well with East Punjab, or with the Hindus and Sikhs. First, he noted that even in places like Ambala and Jullunder, '99%' of the Anglo Indians had declared for Pakistan, because 'they feel that their culture will be preserved and their freedom of religion guaranteed.'[108] Secondly, he argued that in the Indian Constituent Assembly, Mr P.D. Tandon of the Indian National Congress had opposed the principle of conversion. This, Gibbon argued, was untenable for his community as their sheer existence stemmed from conversion. 'Propagation of faith and conversion is an article of faith with us, Christians, and for which we, like others, are prepared to lay down our lives,' he noted.[109] Thirdly,

Gibbon stated that in a discussion over the formation of a cross community ministry in the Punjab at Delhi with the central Defence Minister Sardar Baldev Singh, the minister had practically threatened the community in case it supported the Muslim League in forming the ministry. According to Gibbon, when Frank Anthony had asked Baldev Singh about the Sikh attitude towards the Anglo-Indians if they supported the Muslim League, Baldev said that there would be 'complete boycott and more trouble.'[110] This veiled threat, Gibbon emphasised, made him determined to oppose the Congress and side with the Muslim League. Hence, Gibbon pleaded with the commission not to 'split' them but to consider them 'as "another factor" in favour of Pakistan.'[111]

## Conclusion

In the lunatic asylum where the main protagonist, Bishan Singh, of Urdu writer Saadat Hasan Manto's short story, *Toba Tek Singh*, resided there were also two Anglo-Indians, in the 'European' ward. Since the news that consequent to the creation of India and Pakistan, there shall be an exchange of lunatics according to religion, there was a flurry of activity amongst the inmates, all wondering where they will end up being. While Bishan Singh, a Sikh, only wanted to go to his native town of 'Toba Tek Singh' and spent most of his time wondering and asking people where it went, and other Muslims and Hindus also contemplated their future, the Anglo-Indians were also worried and 'very much shocked.'[112] Being the 'hybrid' nation, they were worried about their 'status.' They were concerned if the European ward would be kept or abolished, and most immediately they were concerned if they would still get bread for breakfast or would have to 'choke down those bloody Indian chapattis?'[113] Thereafter, these stereotypical Anglo-Indians disappear from the scene, never to be encountered again. In many ways the literature on partition reflects this disappearance, Anglo-Indians seldom feature in the narrative, as if their status was unproblematic and required no research.

Manto wrote *Toba Tek Singh* in 1955 as a satire on the partition and independence of India and Pakistan. The 'rationality' of the partition was strongly upset by the 'irrationality' of the inmates of the lunatic asylum, who in turn mocked the whole process. Asking where Toba Tek Singh is now since at one time it was in India, but now appears to be in Pakistan, and whether it could disappear altogether, marks a deep and critical attack on the 'rationality' of borders, division and all which this process entailed. As Ayesha Jalal puts it succinctly: 'Manto's message is searing but clear: the madness of partition was greater than the insanity of all the inmates put together.'[114]

However, what interests us for the purpose of this article is the appearance and then disappearance of the two Anglo-Indians. Echoing the words of the character Patrick Taylor from *Bhowani Junction*, they are what they were and

could only stay where they were. However, as Namita Goswami notes, 'In fact, they have no such choice, between being British or Indian, because they are and will continue to be actually left behind, not just by the British but by the history that creates Hindustan and Pakistan in the name of and as the name of its Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh subjects.'[115] Their appearance in the short story signifies their presence and agency in the story of partition, but their disappearance immediately afterwards denotes the inability of the main characters – Hindu, Sikh and Muslim, to allow them a place in the end. While Hindus and Sikhs go to India and Muslims stay behind in Pakistan, and Bishan Singh stays put on the dividing line between the two countries, there is no closure for these Anglo-Indians, perhaps only erasure. As Goswami concludes:

> … while Bishan Singh's cry as he places his body on the barbed wire that separates India from Pakistan, a rational division of self between the two nations, can still be heard, it is the invisibility and silence of the two Anglo-Indians that we find in a forgotten insane asylum somewhere in the Pakistan that is also Hindustan and Britain and the Hindustan that is also Pakistan and Britain. Their absent bodies become the un-nameable place of the in-between and the incommensurable, and their silence the speaking of their racial hybridity.[116]

The above study has given political voice to this 'in-between,' and 'hybrid' community – terms which are often used for them pejoratively, rather than as a sign of distinctiveness. However, since the Anglo-Indians did not fit the neat binaries of 1947 India, they have very often been deliberately forgotten in the discourse on partition. Their lives have also been mainly either exoticised or trivialised, like in the short story where their main concern is whether if they will get bread in breakfast or 'bloody Indian Chapati' (though in a sense, having being 'left behind' could they have contemplated anything else than their immediate reality, one might ask?).[117] But the Anglo-Indians were no passive observers of the partition of the Punjab. They had agency and their leaders tried their best to make the community consequential and gain a seat at the table. The manoeuvrings of Anglo-Indian politicians in the Punjab in 1946–1947, the rupture between the national and provincial leadership, support to the Muslim League, and then eventual joining Pakistan, all exhibit the dynamic, eager and active politics of the community. Despite being called and considered 'marginal' by many, the community was exhibiting self-confidence, ability and a yearning to be seriously taken as a political player.

In understanding Anglo-Indian politics in the Punjab, the figure of C.E. Gibbon is the most interesting. Elected to the Punjab Assembly in 1946 for the first time, his election was twice challenged, and on the eve of the partition itself, he was not even part of the Assembly. Notwithstanding clear dissension in the community over his election, Gibbon's public break with the leader of the Anglo-Indians at the centre, Frank Anthony, is remarkable. Not only does Gibbon strongly come out in favour of the Muslim League as the partition

plan is announced, he goes so far as to call himself an 'Anglo-Muslim' and the community in the Punjab as the 'Anglo-Muslim race.' Hardly true, but mirroring similar attempts by Dewan Bahadur S.P. Singha, the leader of the Indian Christians in identifying his community with the Muslims, this argument by Gibbon was both a pragmatic statement – as most Anglo-Indians in the Punjab were going to fall in Pakistan, and a positioning, since he thought that identifying with Muslims would improve the chances of his community keeping its privileges in independent Pakistan. In doing so, Gibbon reflected the moves by both Frank Anthony in India and C.H. Campagnac in Burma, who tried to align the identity of their community with the identity of the new nation-states they were foreseeing.[118] In a paradoxical manner, the crux of Anglo-Indian problems in the past – that of their identity not being considered stable and fluid, came to their rescue in these circumstances as it enabled them to fashion it according to the needs of the developing social and political milieu around them.

Gibbon's novel attempt at creating a new 'Anglo-Muslim race' was perhaps his lasting contribution to the development of the community. The 'Muslimisation' of the community by Gibbon, so to speak, should be seen as continuing the long search for a 'homeland' for the Anglo-Indians, be it McCluskieganj in the 1930s, or the demand to be given the Andaman Islands in 1947.[119] Just as the Muslims of India were seeking a new homeland, or in the words of Dhulipala, were 'creating a new Medina,' Gibbon also sought to create a new identity in a homeland for the Anglo-Indians. Gibbon tried to make full use of the fluidity in the 'hybridity' of the Anglo-Indians, so as to secure a better future for them in independent Pakistan.[120]

However very quickly, Gibbon's theory floundered within the community, hinting that perhaps he might be one of the few (if not the only one) who subscribed to such an idea. The endeavour to create an alternative to the 'Anglo-Indian by community and Indian by nationality,' argument by Frank Anthony, failed almost at first attempt. Just like, as argued by Alison Blunt, there was resistance at home (and even politically), to the Indian nationalist stance of Anthony, there was little take up of this new notion among the Anglo-Indians who ended up in West Punjab, exhibiting the 'much more complex attachment to both India and Britain before Independence,' than currently understood.[121] In her recent article Dorothy McMenamin further exhibits that the term 'Anglo-Pakistani' never caught on in Pakistan. She notes that '"Anglo-Pakistani" failed to convey the significant older historical colonial context. Anglo-Indians saw their heritage derive from British India, not independent India or newly formed Pakistan.'[122] Several of the oral history interviews McMenamin conducted also mentioned that the term 'Anglo-Pakistani' never held currency either inside or outside the community. As one of the interviewees, Fred Lord, commented: 'I call myself an Anglo-Indian. Never used the term Anglo-Pakistani, no one ever said Anglo-Pakistani.

It was either Anglos, or Anglo-Indians … I was born in India, there wasn't a Pakistan at that time.'[123] Thus, it is clear that easy adjustment to Pakistan of Anglo-Indian identity Gibbon assumed was not so forthcoming, and had little currency in the community.

Gibbon's ultimate aim, however, was to utilise the reworking of the Anglo-Indian identity to reap some dividends in the new dominion of Pakistan. It showed that despite the fact that Pakistan was clearly for the 'Muslims' of South Asia (however understood), some minorities thought that the new dispensation would still offer some opportunities for them. Here Gibbon was 'imagining' Pakistan as a non-Muslim, as a place where his community could find some space, representation and an opportunity to thrive. Otherwise, it would have simply made no sense to break with the All-India Anglo-Indian Association and chart a new course for the few thousand Anglo-Indians in the Punjab! This imagination of Pakistan not only proffers that in addition to the several Muslim imaginations of Pakistan, there also existed some 'non-Muslim' imaginations of Pakistan where smaller groups saw in this new country opportunities they could not expect in the Indian dominion.[124] It also attests to the rather fluid and perhaps even unclear nature of the state in Pakistan at inception where several smaller groups could still jockey for influence and a stake.

Unfortunately, unlike Frank Anthony in India who was able to extract several concessions, especially in terms of representation in parliament and protection of jobs, Gibbon was unable to secure any such benefits in Pakistan – his gamble had supremely failed.[125] After the creation of Pakistan, Gibbon wrote to Jinnah, the Governor-General of Pakistan, twice during his visits to Lahore to visit and speak to the Anglo-Indian Association, but both times Jinnah declined the invitations.[126] Undeterred, Gibbon kept on exhorting his community to take an active part in the rehabilitation of refugees by donating funds and working in refugee camps as nurses and doctors.[127] Gibbon again wrote to Jinnah in October 1947 and underscored the valuable contributions of his community to Pakistan, noting that: 'As the smallest minority in Pakistan their contribution towards relieving the distress of their fellow-countrymen, and in maintaining essential services … deserves commendation. In all the principal towns on Pakistan they have volunteered their services as doctors and nurses, and in Lahore are responsible for administering to the injured in the Anglo-Pakistan R.J.J.F. Hospital and lastly, have donated liberally to your Relief Fund.'[128] But these long lists of services did not make a difference now that Pakistan had been created and there is thereafter no record of any correspondence between Gibbon and Jinnah.

Appreciating the nature of Anglo-Indian politics in the Punjab at the time of the 1947 Partition also offers us a different metric in understanding the great event. Not just adding another layer of complexity in the often two dimensional picture, it raises questions of belonging – the Anglo-Indians claimed the Punjab

as much as the Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs; of community, at a time when power was being divested by the British on the basis of what 'communities' (however understood) wanted, the Anglo-Indians also wanted a seat on the table; and ultimately the question of citizenship and rights – concerned about their future, the Anglo-Indians wanted their citizenship to be linked to the land they lived in and were desperate to shore up their rights in the new dispensation.

The political oblivion of the Anglo-Indians within a few years of the creation of Pakistan is telling of the nature of the new majoritarian state of Pakistan. In this, the Anglo-Indian community is not so much erased but rather it is made invisible. They exist in this new post-partitioned post-colonial world, but their identity falls through the cracks. The process of partition has often been understood through the majoritarian perspectives, but those on the edges and outskirts were either not considered a 'problem' nor were their numbers significant enough to warrant much consideration. The creole identity of the Anglo-Indians, where they were not just a religious or ethnic minority, but a complex mix, further pushed them to the margins. Some of these complex stories of partition are being explored now and they complicate our understanding of simple exchange of population. This further impacted upon the notions of citizenship, legitimacy, and belonging.

## Notes

1. Masters, *Bhowani Junction*, 27–8.
2. See Younger, "Racial Attitudes and Anglo-Indians Perceptions of a Community Before and After Independence". Also, for more on the importance of class in defining Anglo-Indians, see Anderson, *Race and Power in British India*.
3. For an early work on them see Stark, *Hostages to India*.
4. Charlton-Stevens, *Anglo-Indians and Minority Politics*, 155, 220.
5. UK Parliament, *Government of India Act 1935*, Chapter 2, 245. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1935/2/pdfs/ukpga_19350002_en.pdf (accessed on 10 March 2021).
6. Ibid., 220.
7. See, for example, Snell, *Anglo-Indians and their Future*.
8. See *Census of India 1941* (Delhi: Government of India Press, 1941), Vol. VI, Punjab Tables, 43–45. The Census counted just over 6,000 Anglo-Indians in British Punjab and the Punjab Princely States, but their leaders argued that the actual number was as high as 10,000.
9. See, for example, Gist and Wright, *Marginality and Identity*; Cottrell, "Today's Asian-Western Couples Are Not Anglo-Indians."
10. Stoler, "Rethinking Colonial Categories; European Communities and the Boundaries of Rule."
11. Cooper and Stoler, eds., *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Culture in a Bourgeois World*, VIII.
12. Bear, *Lines of the Nation: Indian Railway Workers, Bureaucracy, and the Intimate Historical Self*; Caplan, *Children of Colonialism: Anglo-Indians in a Postcolonial World*.

13. Charlton-Stevens, "The End of Greater Anglo-India."
14. McMenamin, *Anglo-Indian Lives in Pakistan through the Lens of Oral Histories*, 100.
15. See McMenamin, "The Curious Exclusion of Anglo-Indians from the Mass Slaughter during the Partition of India."
16. Caplan, *Children of Colonialism*, 11.
17. Khan, *The Great Partition*, 100.
18. There is no mention of Anglo-Indian politics in first-hand accounts like Campbell-Johnson, *Mission with Mountbatten*, Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India*, Moon, *Divide and Quit*: Lapierre and Collins, *Freedom at Midnight*. Only in Hodson's *The Great Divide*, in two sentences it is noted that 'For the Anglo Indian community Mr Frank Anthony protested bitterly against the blows they had been dealt by the Cabinet Mission and Lord Wavell, and appealed to Lord Mountbatten to look after their interests in the transfer of power. The Viceroy, though sympathetic, held out little hope that there was anything he could do for them.' Hodson, *The Great Divide: Britain, India, Pakistan*, 237.
19. See, for example, Zamindar, *The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia*; Virdee, *From the Ashes of 1947: Reimagining Punjab*.
20. See, for example, mention of the Anglo-Indians at the Punjab Assembly vote and the Boundary Commission in Ahmed, *The Punjab: Bloodied, Partitioned, Cleansed*, 219 and 267.
21. Grimshaw, "The Anglo-Indian Community."
22. See, Gidney, "The Future of the Anglo-Indian Community."
23. 'The Problem of Minorities in India,' *Anglo-Indian Review* (May 1931): 11, cited in Charlton-Stevens, *Anglo-Indians and Minority Politics*, 220.
24. 'Lord Lloyds Speech,' *Anglo-Indian Review* (Jan 1936): 13, cited in Charlton-Stevens, *Anglo-Indians and Minority Politics*, 222.
25. Government of India Act, Act 1935, chapter 2, 147–48.
26. Wallace, *The Life of Sir Henry Gidney*, 244.
27. Anthony, *Britain's Betrayal in India*: *The Story of the Anglo-Indian Community*, 150.
28. Ibid., 150.
29. *Anglo-Indian Review*, Oct 1944.
30. Frank Anthony, 157.
31. Ibid., 161–62.
32. In his autobiography, Anthony recounts the incident in these words:

> There was a special flutter in the Association … at Lahore. At the following Annual General Meeting there was an attempt to get me out of office unless I undertook to declare that our policies were not only pro-Government but pro-British. I treated this suicidal myopia with the public whipping it deserved. Ibid., 151.

33. 'Mr. Few's Letter, Dated 21st December 1942,' *Anglo-Indian Review* (March 1943), 18, cited in Charlton-Stevens, *Anglo-Indians and Minority Politics*, 228.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., 228–29.
36. Information gleaned from the Punjab Assembly website. https://www.pap.gov.pk/en/members/past-members (accessed 10 March 2021).
37. The Unionist party, founded in 1923, was a cross communal party in the Punjab composed of mainly the landowning classes from the Muslim, Hindu and Sikh communities. It formed the first full responsible government in the province in 1937 which lasted till March 1947, when due to the deteriorating law and order situation and

Muslim League pressure, it resigned. For more see Talbot, *Khizr Tiwana, the Unionist Party and the Partition of India*; Tanwar, *The Politics of Sharing Power*.

38. *Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates (PLAD)*, 1st Session, Vol. 1, 6 July 1937, 1065.
39. *PLAD*, 5 July 1938, 645.
40. *PLAD*, 4 Dec 1942, 72.
41. *PLAD*, 4 Dec 1941, 78.
42. Charlton-Stevens, "The End of Greater Anglo-India," 87.
43. *PLAD*, 3 Nov 1939, 509.
44. Ibid.
45. *Times of India (ToI)*, 24 June 1946, 1.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. *ToI*, 8 Oct 1946, 9.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Frank Anthony, 183–84.
52. See *Constituent Assembly of India Debates (CAID)*, Debates, Vol 1, 9 Dec 1946.
53. See *CAID*, Vol 1, 11 Dec 1946, and 23 Dec 1946.
54. See *CAID*, Vol 1, 23 Dec 1946.
55. *TOI*, 13 March 1946, 8.
56. *CAID*, 23 June 1946, 7. The extent of the support of Gibbon to the Muslim League at this early stage seems unclear since not only does he accept a Congress ticket to the Constituent Assembly within a few weeks, he praises the Congress at the Rawalpindi Anglo-Indian meeting on 8 July 1946. On 20 July 1946 he also accepts the position of Private Parliamentary Secretary in the coalition Punjab Government, further making questionable his adherence to the Muslim League. See, *TOI*, 22 July 1946, 8.
57. *TOI*, 4 July 1946, 1.
58. *TOI*, 14 April 1947, 1.
59. Frank Anthony, 192.
60. *TOI*, 23 April 1947, 7.
61. Ibid.
62. *Pakistan Times*, 24 April 1947, 6.
63. *The Tribune*, 18 April 1947, 5.
64. *The Tribune*, 24 April 1947, 4.
65. *Pakistan Times*, 30 April 1947, 3.
66. *Pakistan Times*, 13 May 1947, 7.
67. *Pakistan Times*, 13 May 1947, 10.
68. *Dawn*, 7 June 1947, 5.
69. *Dawn*, 8 June 1947, 5.
70. C.E. Gibbon to M.A. Jinnah, 2 May 1947, F. 493/2, Zaidi, ed., *Jinnah Papers* (*JP*), First Series, Vol. 1 Part 1, No. 377.
71. Ibid. Emphasis in original.
72. *Dawn*, 9 June 1947, 8.
73. Ibid.
74. *Dawn*, 9 June 1947, 1.
75. *Dawn*, 11 June 1947, 1.
76. *Dawn*, 14 June 1947, 8.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.

79. C.E. Gibbon to M.A. Jinnah, 4 June 1947, F. 493/3, Annex II. Indian New Chronicle, 13 June 1947, in *JP*, Vol. II, No. 11.
80. *TOI*, 14 June 1947, 8.
81. *Pakistan Times*, 13 June 1947, 3.
82. *Pakistan Times*, 15 June 1947, 3.
83. *Pakistan Times*, 25 June 1947, 5.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. *PLAD*, Vol. XXVI, No. 1, 23 June 1947, 1–3.
87. Ibid., 3–4.
88. Ibid., 4–5.
89. Ibid., 5–6.
90. C.E. Gibbon to M.A. Jinnah, 4 July 1947, F. 674/8, in *JP*, Vol. III, No. 20.
91. Sir Firoz Khan Noon to M.A. Jinnah, 13 July 1947, F. 399/184-5, in *JP*, Vol. III, No. 142.
92. *Dawn*, 13 Aug 1947, 6.
93. Ibid.
94. *Pakistan Times*, 20 June 1947, 8.
95. *The Tribune*, 27 July 1947, 9.
96. *Dawn*, 1 Aug 1947, 7.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. *Dawn*, 14 Aug 1947, 2.
100. Notification, Secretariat of the Governor General (Reforms), 30 June 1947, L/P&J/16/117, India Office Records, British Library.
101. Ibid.
102. Arguments of the Anglo-Indians, Sadullah, ed., *The Partition of the Punjab 1947*, Vol. II, 236.
103. Ibid. See, however, Younger, "Racial Attitudes," where she argues that 'to compensate for the low status imputed to their forebearers, many Anglo-Indians claimed they were of princely origin.' 37.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid., 237.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid., 238.
110. Ibid., 239. The partition of the Punjab left the Sikhs in a very precarious situation. A religion and a polity founded and largely present only in the Punjab, the British had taken over power from the Sikhs in 1849. A century later, the Sikhs were being divided between two countries, despite their protestations for a Sikh homeland 'Khalistan.' The denial of a separate Sikh dominated state led to militancy amongst its population and became a key reason for the disturbances, and even massacres, in the Punjab in the summer of 1947. For more details see Chatterjee, *The Sikh Minority and the Partition of the Punjab, 1920–1947*; Singh and Shani, *Sikh Nationalism*.
111. Ibid.
112. Saadat Hasan Manto, *Toba Tek Singh*, trans. Frances Pritchett, Columbia University, http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00urdu/tobateksingh/translation.html, Accessed 1 May 2021.

113. Ibid.
114. Jalal, *The Pity of Partition: Manto's Life, Times and Work across the India-Pakistan Divide*, 186.
115. Goswami, "Shifting Grounds: Identity, Partition and the Anglo-Indian Subject of History."
116. Ibid.
117. See D'Cruz, "My Two Left Feet: The Problem of Anglo-Indian Stereotypes in Post-Independence Ando-English Fiction"; D'Cruz, *Midnight's Orphans: Anglo-Indians in Post/Colonial Literature*.
118. See Frank Anthony, Chapter 8, and Charlton-Stevens, "The end of Greater Anglo-India," especially 83–90.
119. For a discussion on Anglo-Indian 'homelands' in India, see Lahiri-Dutt, *In Search of a Homeland: Anglo-Indians and MuCluskiegunge*; Anderson, "The Andaman Islands Penal Colony: Race, Class, Criminality and the British Empire"; *House of Commons Debates*, 30 June 1947, Vol, 439, cc925-6.
120. For more on 'hybridity' see Mijares, '"You are an Anglo-Indian?" Eurasians and Hybridity and Cosmopolitanism in Salman Rushdie's Midnights Children.'
121. See Blunt, "'Land of our Mothers,' Home, Identity, and Nationality for Anglo-Indians in British India."
122. McMenamin, "The Dilemma of Anglo-Indian Identity in Pakistan," 211.
123. Ibid.
124. For more on how minorities viewed partition, see Nair, *Changing Homelands: Hindu Political and the Partition of India*; Roy, *Partitioned Lives: Migrants, Refugees and Citizens in India and Pakistan, 1947–1965*.
125. See Frank Anthony, Chapter 9, and Charlton-Stevens, *Anglo-Indians and Minority Politics*, 235–48.
126. M.A. Jinnah to C.E. Gibbon, 30 Aug 1947, No. F. 493/6, in *JP*, First Series, Vol. VI, No. 170.
127. For details see, *Pakistan Times*, 2 September 2, 1947, 3; *Pakistan Times,* 9 September 1947, 3 and 8.
128. C.E. Gibbon to M.A. Jinnah, 27 Oct 1947, F.25 (Part 1)-GG/242, in *JP*, First Series, Vol. VI, No. 127.

## Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office for granting him the Chevening Fellowship, and the Director and Fellows of the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies for hosting him during the research and writing of this article. Thanks are also due to Dr Pippa Virdee and Dr Uther Charlton-Stevens for their valuable comments.

## Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

## References

Ahmed, Ishtiaq. *The Punjab: Bloodied, Partitioned, Cleansed*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Anderson, Clare. "The Andaman Islands Penal Colony: Race, Class, Criminality and the British Empire." *International Review of Social History* 63, no. S26 (2018): 25–43. doi:10.1017/S0020859018000202

Anderson, Valerie. *Race and Power in British India: Anglo-Indians, Class and Identity in the Nineteenth Century*. London: Bloomsbury, 2015.

Anthony, Frank. *Britain's Betrayal in India: The Story of the Anglo-Indian Community*. New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1968.

Bear, Laura. *Lines of the Nation: Indian Railway Workers, Bureaucracy, and the Intimate Historical Self*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.

Blunt, Alison. "'Land of our Mothers': Home, Identity, and Nationality for Anglo-Indians in British India, 1919–1947." *History Workshop Journal* 54, no. 1 (2002): 49–72. doi:10.1093/hwj/54.1.49

Campbell-Johnson, Alan. *Mission with Mountbatten*. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1953.

Caplan, Lionel. *Children of Colonialism: Anglo-Indians in a Postcolonial World*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2001.

Census of India. Delhi: Government of India Press, 1941.

Charlton-Stevens, Uther. *Anglo-Indians and Minority Politics in South Asia*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2018.

Charlton-Stevens, Uther. "The End of Greater Anglo-India: Partitioned Anglo Identities in Burma and Pakistan." In *Anglo-Indian Identity: Past and Present, in India and the Diaspora*, edited by Robyn Andrews, and Merin Simi Raj, 63–107. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021.

Chatterjee, Chhanda. *The Sikh Minority and the Partition of the Punjab, 1920–1947*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2018.

Constituent Assembly of India Debates. New Delhi, Constituent Assembly, 1946.

Cooper, Frederick and Ann Laura Stoler, editors. *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Culture in a Bourgeois World*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.

Cottrell, A.B. "Today's Asian-Western Couples Are Not Anglo-Indians," *Phylon (1960)* 40, no. 4 (4th Qtr., 1979): 351–361. doi:10.2307/274532

D'Cruz, Glenn. *Midnight's Orphans: Anglo-Indians in Post/Colonial Literature*. Oxford: Peter Lang, 2006.

D'Cruz, Glenn. "My Two Left Feet: The Problem of Anglo-Indian Stereotypes in Post-Independence Indo-English Fiction." *The Journal of Commonwealth Literature* 38 (2003): 105–123. doi:10.1177/00219894030382007

Frances Pritchett, translator. "Toba Tek Singh by Manto" Columbia University. Accessed May 1, 2021. http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00urdu/tobateksingh/translation.html

Gidney, Henry. "The Future of the Anglo-Indian Community." *Asiatic Review* 30 (1934): 30–39.

Gist, Noel, and Roy Wright. *Marginality and Identity: Anglo-Indians as a Racially-Mixed Minority in India*. Leiden: Brill, 1973.

Goswami, Namita. "Shifting Grounds: Identity, Partition and the Anglo-Indian Subject of History," *South Asian Review*, 27, no. 1 (2006): 74–98.

Government of India Act, 1935. London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1935.

Grimshaw, Allen. "The Anglo-Indian Community: The Integration of a Marginal Group," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 18, no. 2 (1959): 227–240.

Hodson, H. V. *The Great Divide: Britain, India, Pakistan*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1985.

*House of Commons Debates*. London: Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 1947.

Jalal, Ayesha. *The Pity of Partition: Manto's Life, Times and Work Across the India-Pakistan Divide*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013.
Khan, Yasmin. *The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan*. London: Yale University Press, 2007.
Lahiri-Dutt, Kuntala. *In Search of a Homeland: Anglo-Indians and MuCluskiegunge*. Calcutta: Minerva, 1990.
Lapierre, Dominique, and Larry Collins. *Freedom at Midnight*. London: William Collins & Co, 1975.
Masters, John. *Bhowani Junction*. London: Viking, 1954.
McMenamin, Dorothy. Anglo-Indian Lives in Pakistan Through the Lens of Oral Histories. *PhD Diss.*, University of Otago, 2019.
McMenamin, Dorothy. "The Curious Exclusion of Anglo-Indians from the Mass Slaughter During the Partition of India," *International Journal of Anglo-Indian Studies* 9, no. 1 (2006): 1–18.
McMenamin, Dorothy. "The End of Greater Anglo-India: Partitioned Anglo Identities in Burma and Pakistan." In *Anglo-Indian Identity: Past and Present, in India and the Diaspora*, edited by Robyn Andrews and Merin Simi Raj, 205-229. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021.
Menon, V. P. *The Transfer of Power in India*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957.
Mijares, Loretta. "'You are an Anglo-Indian?" Eurasians and Hybridity and Cosmopolitanism in Salman Rushdie's Midnights Children." *Journal of Commonwealth Literature* 38, no. 2 (2003): 127–131.
Moon, Penderel. *Divide and Quit: An Eyewitness Account of the Partition of India*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962.
Nair, Neeti. *Changing Homelands: Hindu Political and the Partition of India*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011.
Punjab Assembly. "Members". Punjab Assembly. Accessed March 10, 2021. https://www.pap.gov.pk/en/members/past-members
*Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates*. Lahore: Superintendent, Government Printing, Punjab, 1937–47.
Roy, Haimanti. *Partitioned Lives: Migrants, Refugees and Citizens in India and Pakistan, 1947–1965*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Sadullah, Mohammad. *The Partition of the Punjab 1947. 4 Vols*. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1983.
Secretariat of the Governor General (Reforms). *Boundary Commission Notification*. New Delhi, 1947.
Singh, Gurharpal, and Giorgio Shani. *Sikh Nationalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021.
Snell, O. *Anglo-Indians and Their Future*. Bombay: Thackery, 1944.
Stark, Herbert Alice. *Hostages to India: Or the Life Story of the Anglo-Indian Race*. Calcutta: The Calcutta Fine Arts College, 1926.
Stoler, Ann Laura. "Rethinking Colonial Categories: European Communities and the Boundaries of Rule." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 31, no. 1 (1989): 134–161. doi:10.1017/S0010417500015693
Talbot, Ian. *Khizr Tiwana, the Unionist Party and the Partition of India*. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1996.
Tanwar, Raghuvendra. *The Politics of Sharing Power: The Punjab Unionist Party, 1923–47*. Delhi: Manohar, 1999.

UK Parliament. "Government of India Act 1935." UK Parliament. Accessed March 10, 2021. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1935/2/pdfs/ukpga_19350002_en.pdf

Virdee, Pippa. *From the Ashes of 1947: Reimagining Punjab*. Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2018.

Wallace, K. *The Life of Sir Henry Gidney*. Calcutta: A. Mukerjee, 1934.

Younger, Coralie. "Racial Attitudes and Anglo-Indians Perceptions of a Community Before and After Independence." *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* 6, no. 2 (2007): 34–45. doi:10.1080/00856408308723045

Zaidi, Z. A., ed. *Jinnah Papers*. First and Second Series. Islamabad: Ministry of Culture, 2003.

Zamindar, Vazira. *The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.